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OPENING THE SCHOOLHOUSE DOOR TO
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
Nine Ohio public high school students who had been suspended
from school for up to 10 days without notice of charges or a hearing,
pursuant to a state statute which permitted such suspensions,' brought
a class action against local school officials seeking a declaration that
the statute violated the procedural due process protections of the
fourteenth amendment and an order directing the officials to expunge
the students' records of the suspensions. A three-judge district court
granted the requested relief and the United States Supreme Court
held, affirmed: Where a state offers free education to a class of people,
students within that class who face temporary suspension from a
public school have both property and liberty interests that qualify for
protection under the due process clause, thereby requiring the public
school to give the students both notice of the charges and a hearing
prior to suspension except in certain emergency situations. Goss v.
Lopez, 95 S. Ct. 729 (1975).
Like most constitutional law decisions of the United States Sup-
reme Court, Goss has implications on two interrelated levels. In its
narrower sense, the holding brings suspension from public schools
within the spreading umbrella of procedural due process protections.
More significantly, however, Goss has distinct implications in relation
to the overall scope of procedural due process which should ultimately
be of much greater consequence in the field of constitutional law than
its bare holding.
The procedural due process aspect of Goss signifies the further
development of a new approach to procedural due process which has
been quietly evolving in a line of cases 2 over the past few years, until
finally crystalizing in Board of Regents v. Roth. 3 The crux of this
approach lies in the Court's more recent definition of the property and
liberty interests encompassed within the due process clause. 4 Here the
Court departs from past due process tests by redefining property and
liberty interests to include a wide spectrum of interests not found
within the traditional definitions of these concepts. 5
1. OHIO REV. CODE § 3313.66 provides:
The superintendent of schools of a city or exempted village, or the executive head of a'
local school district may suspend a pupil from school not more than ten days. Such
superintendent or executive head may expel a pupil from school. Such superintendent or
executive head shall within twenty-four hours after the time of expulsion, notify the
parent or guardian of the child and the clerk of the board of education in writing of such
expulsion, including the reasons therefor. The pupil or the parent, or guardian, or
custodian of a pupil so expelled may appeal such action to the board of education at any
meeting of the board and shall be permitted to be heard against the expulsion ... (emphasis
added).
It should be noted that OHIO REV. CODE § 3313.66 provides procedural protections for
expulsions, but not for suspensions.
2. See notes 7-12 infra.
3. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
4. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
5. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
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Under this approach, "property interests protected by procedural
due process [now] extend well beyond actual ownership of real estate,
chattels or money,"'6 and include claims to such things as a driver's
license, 7 welfare benefits, 8 unemployment compensation, 9 tax exemp-
tions,' 0 public employment," and a public education.' 2 Moreover,
such property interests are generally not created by the Constitution,
but rather by some independent source, such as a state statute.
13
Thus, in Goss the Court was able to find that a protected property
interest, in the form of an entitlement to a public education, had been
created by Ohio statute 14 because it provided for a free public educa-
tion for all residents between the ages. of six and twenty-one.' 5
Unlike the property concept, the protected liberty interest-the
second aspect of the new procedural due process approach-has been
the subject of judicial expansion for some time. It has long been
recognized that an individual's liberty interest under the due process
clause goes far beyond mere freedom from bodily restraint 6 or the
formal constraints of criminal process, 17 but includes
6. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571-72 (1972).
7. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
8. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
9. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1962).
10. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
11. Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956). Such a property interest only
exists, however, when the employee has "more than a unilateral expectation of it." Board of
Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). The employee must have some valid entitlement to it,
such as by reason of tenure, Slochower, or by contract, Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183
(1952), or by promise, Connell v. Higginbothem, 403 U.S. 207 (1971).
12. Goss v. Lopez, 95 S. Ct. 729 (1975). Goss plays a potentially greater role in the
development of this approach than the mere defining of a new property interest under it. The
majority opinion introduces what may prove to be an important refinement by rejecting, albeit
sub silentio, the previous determination in Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974), that the
source creating the property interest may also completely define its dimensions, including the
extent of procedural safeguards that shall accompany its withdrawal.
The extent of this particular phase of the Court's decision is not clear, however, because of
the majority's approach in ignoring, rather than confronting the argument. Thus, it is uncertain
whether future cases will construe Goss narrowly by holding that the Court will only step in to
require procedural due process when the statute creating the property .interest fails to provide for
meaningful procedural safeguards or whether they will follow the dissent of Mr. Justice Marshall
in Arnett, which concluded that once the property interest is created, the Constitution, rather
than the granting statute, will determine what procedural protections are necessary to ensure due
process. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting, joined by Douglas and
Brennan, JJ.). See ilso Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F. 2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
368 U.S. 930 (1961), in which the court noted "that the State cannot condition the granting of even a
privilege upon the renunciation of the constitutional right to procedural due process." Id. at 156.
13. 95 S. Ct. at 735. See also Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). It should
be noted, however, that while the Court finds a protected property interest in the entitlement to a
public education, it has previously held that there is no fundamental constitutional right thereto.
See San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
14. OHIo REV. CODE § 3313.64 provides in part: "The schools of each city, exempted
village, or local school district shall be free to all school residents between six and twenty-one
years of age ....
15. 95 S. Ct. at 736.
16. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
17. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573 (1972).
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the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the
common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to
marry, to establish a home and bring up children, to worship
God according to the dictates of his own conscience and
generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized . . . as
essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men. '
8
Under more recent cases,' this concept of the liberty interest has been
even further expanded to require procedural protections whenever
governmental actions place "a person's good name, reputation, honor
or integrity at stake . . . . " Thus, the Court in Goss, in addition to
finding a protected property interest, also found the threatening of a
liberty interest encompassed within the due process clause by conclud-
ing that suspension could "seriously damage the students' standing
with their fellow pupils and their teachers as well as interfere with
later opportunities for higher education and employment. 2 0
Even though "the range of [these property and liberty] interests
protected by procedural due process is not infinite," 21 certainly it is not
limited to a narrow confine. As Mr. Justice Brennan observed in
Goldberg v. Kelly:
[M]uch of the existing wealth in this country takes the form
of rights that do not fall within the traditional common law
concepts of property. It has been aptly noted that "[S]ociety
today is built around entitlement. The automobile dealer has
his franchise, the doctor and lawyer their professional
licenses, the worker his union membership, contract and
pension rights, the executive his contract and stock options
.... [Moreover] many of the most important of these entitle-
ments now flow from the government: subsidies to farmers
and businessmen, routes for airlines and channels for televi-
sion stations; long term contracts for defense, space and
education; social security pensions for individuals. '22
It is clear that if the Court continues to define property and liberty
interests in terms of these new forms of wealth and status, the full
18. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
19. Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971). The Court found that a state
statute authorizing certain officials to order the posting of a notice prohibiting the sale of liquor to
one who was prone to excessive drinking was violative of procedural due process under the
fourteenth amendment because the statute failed to provide for notice of the charges and a
hearing thereupon.
This form of a liberty interest was first introduced by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in a concur-
ring opinion in Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 149 (1951).
Following Constantineau, this approach was also adopted in Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S.
564 (1972). In Roth, however, the Court concluded that a state's refusal to rehire a non-tenured
professor without making any charge against him that might damage his standing, did not put his
reputation at stake, so that the state's refusal to grant the professor a hearing did not violate
procedural due process.
20. 95 S. Ct. at 736.
21. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570 (1972).
22. 397 U.S. 254, 261 (1970), quoting Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The
Emerging Legal Issues, 74 YALE L.J. 1245, 1255 (1965).
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impact of the Goss approach to procedural due process is still to be
felt.
In adopting this new approach, Goss, as well as its predecessor
Roth, rejects the "severe detriment or grievous loss" test previously
used by the Court to determine whether there was a right to pro-
cedural due process, 23 a test first enunciated by Mr. Justite Frankfur-
ter in his concurring opinion in Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v.
McGrath, 2 4 and then adopted by a majority of the Court in Goldberg
v. Kelly2 5 and Morrissey v. Brewer.26 In rejecting this test, 7 under
which the individual was entitled to procedural due process protec-
tions only when "condemned to suffer grievous loss"'2 8 by the action of
the state, the Goss majority noted that to "determin[e] 'whether the
due process requirements apply in the first place, we must look not to
the 'weight' but to the nature of the interest at stake.' "29 Except to the
extent of measuring -the low threshold of detriment required by the
Court, 30 the length and resulting severity of the deprivation is only
another factor to be used in determining the form of the hearing and
not the basic right thereto. 3 1
"Once it is determined that due process applies, the question
remains what process is due."'32 At the very minimum, because there is
a protected property or liberty interest involved, there must be "some
kind of notice and . . . some kind of hearing.
33
The type of notice and the nature of the hearing is to be deter-
mined by reference to the balancing test set out in Cafeteria Workers
23. In addition to the "severe detriment or grievous loss" test, a second casualty is the "right
v. privilege" test, under which the right to procedural due process was made to turn upon the
characterization of the benefit being deprived as either a "right" or a "privilege." This test
originated in Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950), aff'd 341 U.S. 918 (1951), but it
has been unequivocally repudiated by the Goss line of cases. See notes 7-11 supra.
24. 341 U.S. 123, 149 (1951).
25. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
26. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
27. In urging the adoption of this test the appellees argued that the loss of 10 days from
school was neither severe nor grievous, so that the due process clause was not applicable.
28. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951).
29. 95 S. Ct. at 737, quoting Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570-71 (1972).
30. The Court maintains this low threshold by stating, "as long as a property deprivation is
not de minimis, its gravity is irrelevant to the question [of] whether account must be taken of the
Due Process Clause." 95 S. Ct. at 737.
The question of what constitutes a mere de minimis loss is left unanswered by the Court. In
Goss, the only case which uses this specific term, the Court merely notes that "[a] 10-day
suspension from school is not de minimis . . .," Id.; the cases cited in Goss as authority merely
allude to the concept of some significant interest. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564
(1972); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
31. It should be noted that this distinction has often eluded the lower courts. See, e.g., Goss
v. Lopez, 372 F. Supp. 1279 (S.D. Ohio 1974). This is most likely due to the Supreme Court's
failure to clarify it until Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972). Moreover, when this
balancing test was originally adopted in Cafeteria Workers Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886
(1961), the Court had relied upon the now discredited "right v. privilege test" to determine the
right to procedural due process protections in the first place, further clouding the issue.
32. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
33. 95 S. Ct. at 738.
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Local 473 v. McElroy. Under this test the interest of the state in
providing something less than a full evidentiary hearing35 is balanced
against the individual's interest in avoiding unfair or mistaken depri-
vation of property or liberty. Therefore, the Goss Court, in determin-
ing the type of notice and form of hearing required by due process,
balanced "[t]he student's interest . . . to avoid unfair or mistaken
exclusion from the educational process, with all of its unfortunate
consequences" 3 6 against the school's need to maintain discipline through
suspension, with all of the burdens that would result from the imposition
of elaborate procedural requirements.
The result of this balancing process was the Court's holding 37 that
the public school student, prior to suspension, except in emergency
situations,38 must
be given oral or written notice of the charges against him
and, if he denies them, an explanation of the evidence the
authorities have and an opportunity to present his side of the
story. 3
9
The scope of this holding in relation to the area of students' rights,
however, is not as clear as the decision's previously discussed constitu-
tional implications for procedural due process. The Court seems to
take away in the small print what it gives in the large. Scrutiny of the
guidelines set down leaves serious doubt whether the protections pro-
vided are in fact meaningful. There is no requirement that there be
any type of impartial hearing, 40 a right of review, an opportunity to
prepare a defense, or even that the student understand the charges
against himi. Thus, as the dissenters point out,
[t]he Court only requires oral or written notice to the pupil,
with no notice being required to the parents or the Board of
Education ...
34. 367 U.S. 886 (1961). The Court balanced the government's interest in summarily
denying a civilian employee of private contractor access to a military installation for security
reasons against the employee's interest in maintaining her job on the base, concluding that there
was no violation of the due process clause.
35. The Court has previously noted that the due process clause
does not require a trial type hearing in every conceivable case of government impair-
ment of private interest . . . . The very nature of due process negates any concept of
inflexible procedures universally applicable to every imaginable situation.
Id. at 894-95.
36. 95 S. Ct. at 739.
37. The Court expressly notes that this procedure is limited to short suspensions of 10 days
or less, as longer suspensions or expulsions might require more formal proceedings.
38. An emergency situation may arise, for example, wvhen the student's "presence poses a
continuing danger to persons or property or an ongoing threat of disrupting the academic process
.... .95 S. Ct. at 740. In such cases the suspension may be immediate and the prescribed notice
and hearing are to follow as soon as practicable. Id.
39. Id. For a survey of lower court decisions prior to Goss treating the adequacy of notice
and hearing, see Annot., 58 A.L.R.2d 903 (1958).
40. As the Court notes:
We hold only that, in being given an opportunity to explain his version of the facts at
this discussion, the student first be told what he is accused of doing and what the basis
of the accusation is.
95 S. Ct. at 740.
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Nor does the Court's due process "hearing" appear to
provide significantly more protection than that already avail-
able. The Court holds only that the principal must listen to
the student's "version of the events," either before suspension
or thereafter-depending upon the circumstances .... Such a
truncated "hearing" is likely to be considerably less meaning-
ful than the opportunities for correcting mistakes already
available .... 41
Moreover, the Court expressly "stops short" of interpreting the due
process clause to require that students be afforded the opportunity to
secure counsel, to confront and cross-examine witnesses or even to
call their own witnesses to support their version of the incident. 4 2
While it is clear that the Court's rationale is based upon the
realistic determination that a full evidentiary hearing would be over-
whelmingly burdensome on a school because of the countless number
of suspensions, it seems equally apparent that some middle ground,
providing the student with more meaningful procedural safeguards,
would be more in line with the requirements of the due process clause,
especially in light of the severe consequences of a suspension upon the
student. 43 At the very least, the student should be provided with an
impartial tribunal44 and given the right to confront and cross-examine
his accusers, 45 as well as to call his own witnesses. For as the Court
notes,
[t]he concern would be mostly academic if the disciplinary
process were a totally accurate, unerring process, never mis-
taken and never unfair. Unfortunately this is not the case, and
no one suggests that it is .... The risk of error is not at all trivial,
and it should be guarded against if that may be done without
prohibitive cost or interference with the educational process.4 6
Thus, "[a]lthough a closely knit home-school community is a desirable
ideal, the student's rights should be protected by procedures adapted to
reality. ' '4 7
By giving the entire decision a reading broader than its specific
41. Id. at 747 (Powell, J., dissenting).
42. Id. 'at 740. Most lower court decisions prior to Goss have also held that there is no right
to cross-examination in school discipline hearings, although some have stated that cross-
exbkmination is permissible. Buss, Procedural Due Process for School Discipline: Probing the
Constitutional Outline, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 545, 598 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Buss].
43. See note 23 supra.
44. The failure to require an impartial hearing leaves the efficacy of the Court's other
protections in serious doubt. Without such a safeguard, there is the danger of both personal bias
against the student, especially if he is a "known troublemaker," and risk that the decisionmaker
will have a personal stake in the outcome of the hearing because of a " 'combination of functions'
in which the-decisionmaker plays one or more roles in addition to acting as judge." Buss, supra
note 42, at 617. See also Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1967).
45. In Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 269-70 (1970), the Court stated that "[i]n almost
every setting where important decisions turn on questions of fact, Due Process requires an
opportunity to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses."
46. 95 S. Ct. at 739.
47. Buss, supra note 42, at 561.
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holding, however, Goss may have significant implications in extending
the scope of constitutional rights afforded students. Noting that students
"do not 'shed their constitutional rights' at the school door,"'4 8 the Court
rejects the idea that school officials have either unlimited discretion or
absolute authority over their students, 49 and thus implicitly suggests the
possibility of further developments in student rights.
This movement to cloak students and other minors with fundamen-
tal constitutional protections had its most auspicious beginnings in In re
Gault.50 While Gault is not completely analogous to students' rights
cases,-" it does lay down the principle that "neither the fourteenth
amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone."- 2 Moreover, Gault
further opened the schoolhouse door to the Constitution by stressing the
concept that "the good motives and alleged achievements of the state's
procedures are not enough when a serious threat to individual liberty,
even a child's . . . , is involved. '53
With the stage so set, 54 the first protections expressly afforded stu-
48. 95 S. Ct. at 736, quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506
(1969).
49. Although the dissenters argue that the majority's decision gives the federal courts, rather
than the school systems, the authority to structure classroom discipline., the Court has long
recognized that its
duty to apply the Bill of Rights to assertions of official authority [does not] depend upon
[the Court's] possession of marked competence in [a] field where the invasion of rights
occurs .... [The Court] cannot, because of modest estimates of [its] competence in such
specialties as public education, withhold the judgment that history authenticates as the
function of this Court when liberty is infringed.
West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943). Furthermore, it has been
suggested that "[h]owever little courts may know about education or school discipline, they do
know about fact finding, decision making, fairness and procedure." Buss, supra note 42, at 571.
50. 387 U.S. 1 (1967). The Court reversed the dismissal of the habeas corpus petition of a 15-
year old who had been committed to a reform school for a term of up to six years for making an
obscene phone call, even though the evidence was largely hearsay and the maximum sentence for
an adult convicted of the same crime would have been $50 or two months in jail. The plaintiff
was given -neither adequate notice of the hearing and charge, nor advised of his right to remain
silent, and at the juvenile hearing, he was denied the rights of cross-examination and counsel.
51. "Although Gault heralded a constitutional revolution in juvenile proceedings, several
considerations urge caution in analogizing it to the school discipline area." Buss, supra note 42, at
557. First, although Gault is technically not a criminal case, it is quasi-criminal in nature and is
treated as such by the Court. Secondly, and even more significantly, the public school and
juvenile justice systems play widely divergent roles in society. The former is intended to provide
an education, while the latter is intended to prevent anti-social conduct or rehabilitate offenders.
Id.
52. 387 U.S. at 13.
53. Buss, supra note 42, at 558.
54. Although not dealing with students' rights per se, a line of cases imposing various
constitutional limitations upon the actions of school authorities formed an important part of the
background to the students' rights decisions by creating a strong precedent for the Court's
intrusion into the domain of public education. See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968)
(statute prohibiting the teaching of the theory of evolution to students violated the first amend-
ment's establishment clause); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967) (statute
providing for teachers' automatic dismissal for certain specified offenses violated the first amend-
ment's right to freedom of association); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960) (compelling
teachers to disclose every associational tie violated the first amendment right to freedom of
association); State ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948) (the encouraging of
religious instruction in the school violated the first amendment's establishment clause); Board of
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dents were, naturally enough, the most fundamental-those of the first
amendment. Thus, shortly after Gault,5 5 the Court declared in Tinker v.
Des Moines Community School District5 6 that a school could not regulate
a student's speech or expression unless it had a constitutionally valid
reason to do so. The Court also made clear that the state may not impose
whatever unreasonable conditions that it chooses upon attendance at
public schools.5 7
Goss is a natural second step in this process, forming a logical
counterpart to Tinker. While Tinker is the first case expressly to consider
students' substantive constitutional rights, Goss is the first to examine
students' procedural constitutional protections.
Just how far the students' rights movement will go is not yet clear.
Although the schoolhouse door has finally been opened, the Court has
often taken the position that "the full panoply of rights due a defen-
dant in . . . a [criminal] proceeding does not necessarily apply to other
types of proceedings. '5 8 The Court clearly takes this stance in Goss by
denying students facing suspensions the rights to counsel, cross-
examination and confrontation. 59 Moreover, a majority of the present
Court, composed of Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart, Powell,
Blackmun, and Rehnquist, has expressed the view that the constitu-
tional rights of "children" are not necessarily co-extensive with those of
adults. 60 Given this situation, it is not certain how the Court will
respond to future students' rights questions involving the constitutional
issues of search and seizure, freedom of the press, freedom of associa-
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (statute requiring all students to salute the flag violated
the first amendment's right to freedom of religion); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923)
(statute prohibiting the teaching of a foreign language to students violated the due process clause).
55. Three of the decisions also had the corollary effect of extending the first amendment's
guarantee of freedom of religion to students, but in each case the Court did so without expressly
considering the question of ,the students' constitutional rights, most likely because each was
brought by and in the name of adults. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962); State ex rel.
McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948); Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624
(1943).
There is also a line of cases dealing with schools and the equal protection clause; however,
these decisions are based upon racial discrimination, rather than upon students' rights. See
Rogers v. Paul, 382 U.S. 198 (1965); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
56. 393 U.S. 504 (1969). It was held that a school regulation prohibiting the wearing of
black armbands to protest the Vietnam War violated the students' first amendment right to
freedom of expression in the absence of any facts which might have reasonably led school officials
to believe that such actions would cause substantial disruptions of school activities.
57. Id. at 506. The Court expressly rejected the argument that Hamilton v. Regents, 293
U.S. 245 (1934) supported the proposition that a state may impose whatever conditions that it
chooses upon attendance at public schools. Rather, the Court noted that Hamilton was confined
to the narrow holding that a school may require a student to participate in a military science class
without violating his freedom of conscience.
58. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (parole hearing). See also Cafeteria Workers
Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961) which involved a proceeding by a military base
commander to revoke the security clearance of a civilian employee on the base.
59. 95 S. Ct. at 740.
60. Id. at 744 (Powell, J., dissenting); Tinker v. Des Moines Community School Dist.,
393 U.S. 503, 515 (1969) (Stewart, J., concurring).
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tion, and cruel and unusual punishment, to name just a few. It can
only be suggested that the Court will employ a case-by-case approach
similar to that used by the "fundamentalist" justices 61 in applying the
Bill of Rights to the states.
ROBERT D. PELTZ
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT REQUIRES DISCLOSURE
OF IRS LETTER RULINGS
Tax Analysts & Advocates, a public interest law firm, petitioned
the Internal Revenue Service' for disclosure of certain letter rulings,
technical advice memoranda, and related communications. 2 These had
been issued by the Service to producers of certain minerals regarding
the Service's determination of which processes were "mining" within
the meaning of subsection 613(c) of the Internal Revenue Code. 3 After
its petition was denied, and other administrative alternatives ex-
hausted, Tax Analysts & Advocates sued in federal district court
to compel disclosure of the rulings under the Freedom of Informa-
tion Act. 4 The IRS contended that these rulings were not within the
scope of the Act, and, alternatively, that they were specifically exempt
from disclosure. The district court rejected both of these positions and
ordered disclosure of the letter rulings, technical advice memoranda,.
61. Mr. Justice Harlan, one of the Court's staunchest fundamentalists, defined fundamen-
talism by saying that it
start[s] with the words "liberty" and "due process of law" and attempt[s] to define them
in a way that accords with American traditions and our system of government. This
approach, involving a much more discriminating process of adjudication than does
"incorporation," is ... the one that was followed throughout the 19th and most of the
present century. It entails a "gradual process of judicial inclusion and exclusion," seek-
ing, with due recognition of constitutional tolerance for state experimentation and
disparity, to ascertain those "immutable principles . . . of justice which inhere in the
very idea of free government which no member of the Union may disregard."
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 176 (1968). Justice Harlan continued by pointing out that
"[t]he logically critical thing ... was not that the rights had been found in the Bill of Rights, but
that they were deemed, in the context of American legal history, to be fundamental." Id. at 179.
1. Hereinafter referred to as the IRS or Service.
2. "A [letter] 'ruling' is a written statement issued to a taxpayer . . . which interprets and
applies the tax laws to a specific set of facts." 26 C. F.R. § 601.201(a)(2) (1974). It is requested by
a taxpayer who desires to know in advance the tax consequences of a proposed action.
A technical advice memorandum is issued by the National Office of the IRS to a District
Director who requests advice regarding treatment of a specific set of facts contained in a return
filed by a taxpayer. Id., § 601. 105(b)(5) (1974).
The communications involved included correspondence to and from the IRS in regard to the
rulings sought, memoranda of conferences, telephone calls and index-digest card summaries.
Hereinafter the foregoing will be collectively referred to as rulings except where otherwise
indicated.
3. 26 U.S.C. § 613(c) (1970). This subsection deals with the computation of gross income
from property for percentage depletion purposes.
4. 5 U,.S.C. § 552 (1970).
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tion, and cruel and unusual punishment, to name just a few. It can
only be suggested that the Court will employ a case-by-case approach
similar to that used by the "fundamentalist" justices 61 in applying the
Bill of Rights to the states.
ROBERT D. PELTZ
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT REQUIRES DISCLOSURE
OF IRS LETTER RULINGS
Tax Analysts & Advocates, a public interest law firm, petitioned
the Internal Revenue Service' for disclosure of certain letter rulings,
technical advice memoranda, and related communications. 2 These had
been issued by the Service to producers of certain minerals regarding
the Service's determination of which processes were "mining" within
the meaning of subsection 613(c) of the Internal Revenue Code. 3 After
its petition was denied, and other administrative alternatives ex-
hausted, Tax Analysts & Advocates sued in federal district court
to compel disclosure of the rulings under the Freedom of Informa-
tion Act. 4 The IRS contended that these rulings were not within the
scope of the Act, and, alternatively, that they were specifically exempt
from disclosure. The district court rejected both of these positions and
ordered disclosure of the letter rulings, technical advice memoranda,.
61. Mr. Justice Harlan, one of the Court's staunchest fundamentalists, defined fundamen-
talism by saying that it
start[s] with the words "liberty" and "due process of law" and attempt[s] to define them
in a way that accords with American traditions and our system of government. This
approach, involving a much more discriminating process of adjudication than does
"incorporation," is ... the one that was followed throughout the 19th and most of the
present century. It entails a "gradual process of judicial inclusion and exclusion," seek-
ing, with due recognition of constitutional tolerance for state experimentation and
disparity, to ascertain those "immutable principles . . . of justice which inhere in the
very idea of free government which no member of the Union may disregard."
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 176 (1968). Justice Harlan continued by pointing out that
"[t]he logically critical thing ... was not that the rights had been found in the Bill of Rights, but
that they were deemed, in the context of American legal history, to be fundamental." Id. at 179.
1. Hereinafter referred to as the IRS or Service.
2. "A [letter] 'ruling' is a written statement issued to a taxpayer . . . which interprets and
applies the tax laws to a specific set of facts." 26 C. F.R. § 601.201(a)(2) (1974). It is requested by
a taxpayer who desires to know in advance the tax consequences of a proposed action.
A technical advice memorandum is issued by the National Office of the IRS to a District
Director who requests advice regarding treatment of a specific set of facts contained in a return
filed by a taxpayer. Id., § 601. 105(b)(5) (1974).
The communications involved included correspondence to and from the IRS in regard to the
rulings sought, memoranda of conferences, telephone calls and index-digest card summaries.
Hereinafter the foregoing will be collectively referred to as rulings except where otherwise
indicated.
3. 26 U.S.C. § 613(c) (1970). This subsection deals with the computation of gross income
from property for percentage depletion purposes.
4. 5 U,.S.C. § 552 (1970).
